The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements by Calomiris, Charles W. & Kahn, Charles M.
American Economic Association
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
Author(s): Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Jun., 1991), pp. 497-513
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006515 .
Accessed: 10/08/2011 14:31
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Economic Review.
http://www.jstor.org
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal 
Banking Arrangements 
By CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND CHARLES M. KAHN* 
Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs 
of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is 
developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermedia- 
tion where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds 
but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt 
attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness 
in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmon- 
itors. (JEL G21) 
For centuries, the vast majority of exter- 
nally financed investments have been funded 
by banks, for which demandable-debt in- 
struments (bank notes and checking ac- 
counts) have been the principal source of 
funds. The goal of this paper is to explain 
the emergence of demandable-debt banking 
historically as the primary means of external 
finance in the economy. 
Demandable debt warrants explanation 
because, in several respects, it appears more 
costly than available alternative contracting 
structures. By issuing demandable debt, 
banks created a mismatch between the ma- 
turity of assets and liabilities. This mismatch 
left them exposed to the possibility that 
depositors would attempt to withdraw more 
funds than a bank could supply on short 
notice. When this occurred, the conse- 
quences were costly. Individual banks that 
did not meet their obligations were forced 
into expensive procedures (liquidation or 
receivership) that would not have arisen in 
an equity-based or maturity-matched con- 
tracting structure.1 If depositors en masse 
attempted to withdraw funds from the en- 
tire banking system, banks as a group were 
forced to suspend convertibility of their lia- 
bilities into specie on demand. Such suspen- 
sion was also disruptive and costly. To de- 
fend against either of these undesirable 
consequences, banks had to hold a propor- 
tion of their assets in idle reserves to insu- 
late themselves from excessive withdrawals. 
Given these costs, demandable debt seems 
inferior to both maturity-matched debt and 
equity contracting. However, in this paper, 
we show that demandable debt has an im- 
portant advantage as part of an incentive 
scheme for disciplining the banker. In ef- 
fect, demandable debt permits depositors to 
"vote with their feet"; withdrawal of funds 
is a vote of no-confidence in the activities of 
the banker. Without the ability to make 
early withdrawals, depositors would have 
little incentive to monitor the bank. 
*Department of Economics, Northwestern Univer- 
sity, Evanston, IL 60208, and Department of Eco- 
nomics, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, re- 
spectively. We thank Lee Alston, Herbert Baer, Kyle 
Bagwell, Ben Bernanke, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Doug 
Diamond, Gary Gorton, Monica Hargraves, Charlie 
Jacklin, Dick Jefferis, and participants in the joint 
Northwestern-University of Chicago theory seminar 
and seminars at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
Purdue University, SUNY Stony Brook, the University 
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ence Foundation under grant SES-8511137. We are 
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1Kenneth R. Cone (1983) shows that, in a world of 
full information, the risk of depositor liquidation under 
demandable debt is absent, provided that financial 
intermediaries are maturity-matched. 
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This account gives a natural rationale for 
two important institutional features of 
banking. The so-called "sequential service 
constraint," by which payments were made 
to demanders on a first-come, first-served 
basis, becomes intelligible as a way to make 
monitoring depositors interested in register- 
ing their no-confidence votes at the first 
opportunity. The ease with which banks may 
be forced into liquidation, far from being an 
unfortunate consequence of the contracting 
structure, turns out to be central to the 
structure: we show that, by submitting to 
the threat of liquidation under appropriate 
circumstances, the banker can reduce his 
cost of capital. 
In addition, our account may have wider 
applicability. Features of modern capital 
structures of nonfinancial institutions bear 
important similarities to the historical role 
of demandable debt. Modern-day firms of- 
ten have multilayerd debt structures, in 
which certain debt-holders have priority of 
claim for repayment. Claimants to short- 
term senior debt in modern firms may play 
a similar role to that of the monitoring 
depositors in our model. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec- 
tion I, we contrast our explanation of de- 
mandable debt with the literature based on 
desire for flexibility of consumption. The 
model in Section II demonstrates the value 
of a demandable-debt contract in the case 
of a single investor contracting with the 
banker monopolist. Here, a run corresponds 
to a demand by the investor for liquidation 
of the bank. Section III examines the case 
in which different monitors receive different 
(independent and identically distributed) 
signals. In this case, it pays to have more 
than one depositor monitoring the bank, 
because the quality of signals in the aggre- 
gate improves with the number of monitors. 
Banks find it advantageous to hold reserves 
to provide a buffer that reduces the likeli- 
hood of unwarranted liquidation. An opti- 
mal threshold of withdrawal orders is cho- 
sen at which the bank is liquidated, and 
relative payoffs ensure that the optimal 
number of monitors invest in receiving sig- 
nals. 
At the end of Section III, we briefly and 
informally indicate how solving the incen- 
tive problem facing the banker will also 
make the banker's liabilities more trans- 
actable. Formal models combining the in- 
centive problem and liquidity are an impor- 
tant field for further research.2 Section IV 
summarizes and indicates important limita- 
tions of our results. 
I. Explanations for Demandable Debt 
Recent theoretical work on the role of 
banks has tended to divide into two cate- 
gories. Theory in one category emphasizes 
the role of banks as providing flexibility for 
depositors in the timing of consumption. 
Theory in the other category, to which our 
paper belongs, emphasizes the incentive 
problem inherent in the divergence of inter- 
est between a bank's depositors and its 
managers.3 For reasons indicated below, we 
believe that accounts which ignore the in- 
centive problem facing the banker do not 
adequately explain why banks historically 
settled on demandable debt. 
A. Consumption Flexibility and 
Demandable Debt 
In the past several years, the preeminent 
theoretical analyses of banks, bank runs, 
and bank regulation have assumed that the 
economic role of demandable debt is to 
provide flexibility to risk-averse depositors 
who are uncertain about the timing of their 
future consumption demand.4 In this cate- 
gory of models, bank runs, when they occur, 
are an unfortunate and undesirable side- 
2See Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1988), 
Charles J. Jacklin (1988), and A. P. Villamil (1988) for 
various approaches to combining the liquidity and in- 
centive arguments. 
3Jacklin and Sudipto Bhattacharya (1988) give a 
concise but useful review of these approaches. 
4Fundamental papers that utilize this approach are 
by John Bryant (1980), Douglas W. Diamond and Philip 
Dybvig (1983), and Jacklin (1987). For a model empha- 
sizing the costs to depositors of delay in liquidation, 
see Merwan Engineer (1987). 
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effect of a contract whose whole purpose is 
to provide consumption flexibility. 
Although these models provide both a 
concise formalization of the fact that banks 
provide consumption flexibility and a coher- 
ent account of bank runs, they are unable to 
account for several important institutional 
features of demandable debt. First, in the 
absence of incentive constraints on the part 
of the banker, the optimal arrangement in 
liquidity-based accounts always involves sus- 
pension of convertibility, rather than expen- 
sive liquidation. However, suspension was 
not an option available to individual banks; 
it was only an alternative for the financial 
system as a whole, in the face of system-wide 
panics. Individual banks that could not sat- 
isfy creditors' fears about solvency were not 
permitted to suspend; they were forced to 
close.5 
Second, studies of actual bank failures 
give fraud a prominent place in the list of 
causes. Studies of 19th- and 20th-century 
banking indicate that fraud and conflicts of 
interest characterize the vast majority of 
bank failures for state and nationally char- 
tered banks.6 
Third, receivership resulted from a criti- 
cal mass of depositor withdrawal orders and 
was invoked because of information about 
bank asset values, not because of exogenous 
liquidity needs of individual depositors. In 
cases of massive exogenous demand for an 
individual bank's assets by small depositors, 
banks avoided failure by appealing to other 
banks for loans of reserves; however, when 
large informed depositors (including other 
bankers) concluded that a bank was in trou- 
ble, they would precipitate a run, depleting 
the bank's reserves and forcing it to be 
placed in receivership.7 
These considerations make it apparent 
that the liquidation of banks-which was 
part and parcel of demandable-debt con- 
tracts-was designed to place the assets of 
banks beyond the reach of the banker. The 
rationale for prohibiting banks from sus- 
pending at their own discretion may have 
been the discipline that it imposed on the 
behavior of the banker. Thus, a model of 
demandable debt with bank liquidation 
through receivership should account for the 
desirability of taking control of the bank 
away from the banker at the option of de- 
positors. 
Fourth, the "sequential-service con- 
straint" (first-come, first-served rule) for 
bank withdrawals, which allowed informed 
depositors to receive repayment before 
banks were placed into receivership, also 
5See Calomiris and Larry Schweikart (1988) for a 
discussion of suspension rules during the early U.S. 
experience. Kevin Dowd (1988) argues that individual- 
bank suspension of debt redemption would have been 
beneficial but was prevented by legal prohibitions. We 
argue that the prohibition-of-suspension option clauses 
simply reflected the learned desirability of placing the 
decision regarding whether suspension was "justified" 
outside the control of the individual banker. The legal 
prohibition of option clauses on notes may have been 
perceived as necessary to protect some unsophisticated 
note-holders, while no such law was deemed necessary 
for relatively sophisticated depositors. 
6For example, E. L. Smead (1928) found that three 
of the nine most common causes of bank failure in the 
1920's involved fraudulent or questionable activities by 
the banker: loans to officers and directors, outright 
defalcation, and loans to enterprises in which officers 
and directors were interested. For discussions of the 
role of fraud in earlier eras, see Carter H. Golembe 
and Clark Warburton (1958), George J. Bentson and 
George G. Kaufman (1986), and Calomiris and 
Schweikart (1988). Data on national bank failures, by 
cause, can be found in the Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (1920 pp. 56-79). For 
information on the importance of fraud in more recent 
bank failures, see Comptroller of the Currency (1988). 
7Henry C. Nicholas (1907 p. 26) dismissed the im- 
portance of withdrawals by uninformed depositors in 
causing bank liquidation. He wrote, "If a bank is 
actually in bad shape there is far more likelihood of its 
initial condition being discovered by other banking 
institutions than by the individual depositors of the 
bank .... A run is sometimes started in this manner 
... and continues until it has practically wiped out the 
reserves of the suspected institution, the ordinary de- 
positors receiving their first information regarding the 
position of the bank when that institution is finally 
forced to close its doors and formally apply for a 
receiver." This discussion makes important points about 
bank runs which appear in our model: some depositors 
are informed, while others are not. Runs by informed 
depositors end in liquidation. Informed depositors are 
able to exercise their withdrawal option before unin- 
formed depositors are able to observe the bank's dif- 
ficulty (or the run). 
500 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 1991 
warrants explanation. In cases other than 
banking, payments from bankrupt firms to 
creditors in anticipation of bankruptcy are 
not allowed, and creditors may be forced to 
relinquish such payments during the 
bankruptcy proceeding. Why in the case of 
banking should those who run the bank 
receive preferential treatment in liquidation 
states? 
B. Demandable Debt as an Incentive 
Scheme 
Models in the second category of theory 
on the role of banks begin with the assump- 
tion that bankers have an informational ad- 
vantage in determining which projects are 
most worthy of financing. Therefore, the 
banker has a comparative advantage in allo- 
cating funds for investment, but he also may 
have the ability to act against the interests 
of uninformed depositors.8 
We show that demandable debt can pro- 
vide an incentive-compatible solution to this 
problem in the presence of costly informa- 
tion. The right to take one's money out of 
the bank if one becomes suspicious that 
realized returns are low makes it in the 
depositor's interest to keep an eye on the 
bank. If enough depositors agree with this 
negative assessment of the bank's future, 
liquidation will be called for, and the bank 
will close. The demandable-debt contract 
allows the banker to precommit to a set of 
payoffs he otherwise would not be able to 
offer depositors. 
Not all depositors need monitor the 
banker. We argue that the first-come, 
first-served (sequential service) rule of de- 
mandable debt provides compensation for 
those who choose to invest in information 
and thus avoids free-riding. We view bank 
intermediation, therefore, as a three-sided 
relationship. The monitors pay the costs of 
vigilance but receive the benefit of knowing 
that they will be "first in line" (and thereby 
receive a higher payment than other deposi- 
tors) should it become necessary to with- 
draw their funds from the bank. The depos- 
itors who do not monitor are willing to pay 
the price of being last in line in "bad" 
states, because they receive a benefit in 
return: the active monitors keep the banker 
in line and thereby provide a benefit to the 
passive depositors. Depositors need not re- 
veal whether they are active or passive; the 
same contract works for both types. 
The physical structure we assume in- 
cludes the following important features. 1) 
The bank is operated by a monopolist with 
special access to a profitable investment op- 
portunity which yields either a good or a 
bad realization. 2) There is potential for 
cheating by the banker which takes the form 
of his absconding with a proportion of the 
bank's assets after the investment realiza- 
tion. (One can think of this more generally 
as costly ex post fraudulent behavior which 
the banker undertakes whenever it is more 
profitable to do so than to make the 
promised payments to depositors.) 3) De- 
positors face different costs of obtaining a 
signal that allows them to predict prof- 
itability. 4) An authority exists who will en- 
force contracts (some of which may stipu- 
late conditions for bank liquidation) and 
who can act as receiver for liquidated banks. 
5) Depositors have a reservation level of 
return on their endowments below which 
they will not invest funds with the banker. 
The profit-maximizing banker will act to 
maximize social gain by selecting a contract 
that achieves beneficial intermediation (in- 
vestment in profitable enterprises), while 
8This point is emphasized by Diamond (1984) and 
Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1987). For an 
overview of the relation between agency costs and the 
structure of financial contracts, see Eugene F. Fama 
(1988). Diamond's solution to the delegated-monitor- 
ing problem of financial intermediation relies on two 
assumptions that are absent in our framework: the 
existence of an ex post nonpecuniary penalty that can 
be imposed on the banker and the ability of the banker 
to construct a riskless portfolio through diversification. 
The second assumption permits enforcement of the 
penalty, even if cheating is costly to observe directly, 
whenever the banker fails to meet his obligations. 
Bernanke and Gertler provide a simple macroeco- 
nomic model in which bankers are subject to moral 
hazard and depositors desire liquidity. They explicitly 
assume that costly monitoring and punishment of de- 
faulting bankers are not possible. For them, demand- 
able debt is desirable solely for its liquidity. In our 
model, demandable debt is desirable although liquidity 
demand is absent. 
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avoiding as much as possible the costs asso- 
ciated with absconding or liquidating. We 
find that the demandable-debt contract is 
optimal for a range of parameter values. 
The potential for costly liquidation may be 
more than offset by the social gain that 
comes from enhanced investment opportu- 
nities.9 
II. The Model with a Single Depositor 
A. Physical Structure 
A banker has an investment opportunity, 
but he lacks sufficient capital to take advan- 
tage of it. The investment opportunity costs 
one dollar. Each potential depositor has 
one dollar to invest. We will let S represent 
the total expected return available for a 
dollar's investment elsewhere in the econ- 
omy. We assume that all agents are risk- 
neutral; thus, any scheme the banker devel- 
ops will have to yield a depositor that same 
expected return. 
The investment opportunity yields an un- 
certain payoff which may take one of two 
values, T, or T2, with T2> Tl. The probabil- 
ity of the high outcome is y. The realization 
is unknown to all parties at the outset and is 
observable ex post only by the banker. Thus, 
there is no way to make a contract tied 
directly to the value of Ti.10 
Let period 3 be the date at which the 
payoff is realized and the loan is to be 
repaid. We assume that in period 3, imme- 
diately before repayment, the banker has 
the opportunity to abscond with the funds. 
Absconding is socially wasteful; for con- 
creteness, we will assume that it reduces the 
realization Ti by the proportion A, where 
A is between 0 and 1. 
Although the act of absconding reduces 
the size of the pie that is divided between 
the banker and the depositor, it places the 
banker beyond the reach of the law. There- 
fore, he is no longer constrained to repay 
the loan as initially promised. Thus, any 
promise to pay the depositor an amount P 
is actually an option of the banker either to 
pay P or to leave town with his assets 
diminished by the proportion A. 
The losses from absconding may be inter- 
preted in a variety of ways. They may repre- 
sent the cost of engaging in fraud (payments 
to coconspirators) or the costs (forgone 
earnings) of placing the bank's resources in 
a form that allows theft. The latter interpre- 
tation requires a richer, multiperiod model 
than the one we provide, in which bankers' 
allocation decisions depend on last-period 
earnings. " 
It should be readily apparent that the 
temptation to abscond will be greater with 
lower realizations of Ti. In deciding whether 
9V. Chari and Ravi Jagannathan (1988) provide an 
example of an information-based run for a model that 
has many features in common with ours. A key differ- 
ence is that they assume an (exogeneously imposed) 
negative externality from liquidation of the bank's as- 
sets. In their model, the creation of a liquidation 
technology is not efficient. In our model, there is a 
positive externality from running the bank: when the 
depositor observes a bad signal, he calls for liquidation, 
thereby salvaging some of the bank's value. The bank's 
structure is designed to internalize this positive exter- 
nality and allows nonmonitoring depositors to compen- 
sate monitors for the benefits they provide. 
Our model can also be interpreted as allowing 
depositors to exercise a put option based on the infor- 
mation they receive. However, unlike the usual 
"inside-trading" scenario, the uninformed depositors 
also benefit at the expense of the bank. While the 
uninformed depositors receive a lower payoff than the 
informed depositors, they benefit because the bank is 
prevented from cheating. In the usual scenario (e.g., 
Albert S. Kyle, 1981), the uninformed either lose or the 
informed cannot successfully earn a return on their 
information-production because of free-riding, as in 
Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980). We 
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this com- 
parison to us. 
toWe assume that the banker is not able to trade in 
equity shares. This conforms with the relative illiquid- 
ity of equity trade in the period under examination. It 
could also be generated as a conclusion in a model in 
which bankers possess specialized information about 
investment projects of borrowers. Robert M. Townsend 
(1979) notes that in circumstances when only one party 
has access to information, debt contracts (i.e., contracts 
not contingent on the private information) will often be 
the only feasible alternative. 
"The plausibility of our "leaky bucket" assumption 
and possible multiperiod reinterpretations are dis- 
cussed further in the final section of the paper. For an 
initial generalization of the absconding assumption see 
Calomiris et al. (1990). 
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to abscond, the banker compares the "tax" 
on absconding, AT, with the promised funds 
due the depositor. If the absconding tax is 
less, then absconding is more profitable than 
paying up. Historical evidence confirms the 
greater prevalence of fraud in times of low 
returns to bank investments. 12 
Because of the threat that the banker will 
abscond-a threat against which he cannot 
commit himself-it will generally be neces- 
sary for the banker to increase the payment 
offered to a depositor by a "default pre- 
mium" as protection against those states in 
which the depositor will, in fact, receive 
nothing. 
Note that the addition of a default pre- 
mium can, in turn, increase the probability 
of default, by making it desirable for the 
banker to abscond in good states as well. 
For example, suppose 
S > AT1 
so that any payment promised to the depos- 
itor must be sufficiently large to incur ab- 
sconding in the low realization; that is, a 
promise to pay P will only be honored a 
fraction y of the time. Suppose also that 
yT2-+1(1-y)(1-A)T1> S 
so that the investment would be socially 
desirable (even taking into account the loss 
from absconding in the low realization). 
Then, if 
S > yAT2 
there is no way to promise the depositor 
enough expected payment to make him will- 
ing to invest, despite the social desirability 
of the project; the promised payment would 
have to exceed AT2, making it desirable for 
the banker to abscond all the time. 
Because of the loss of socially desirable 
opportunities, it is useful to have a method 
of thwarting absconding. One such method 
is the liquidation of the bank in period 2. 
Liquidation means that the bank's assets 
are taken over by a receiver, controlled by a 
court. This is an expensive process, not the 
least because the court-appointed and 
court-controlled receiver is likely to be less 
able to realize the full potential of the as- 
sets. On the other hand, the fact that the 
assets are no longer in the banker's control 
preempts any decision by him to abscond 
with the funds. 
We assume that liquidation reduces the 
value of the assets by the proportion L, so 
that L can be regarded as the tax due to 
liquidation. For a complete characterization 
of the process of liquidation, it is necessary 
to take some stand as to the maximum that 
can be feasibly paid to the depositor in the 
case of liquidation. We call this value M, 
and we assume that13 
(1) AT2> M> AT1 
so that the amount that can be guaranteed 
to the depositor in a liquidating contract is 
greater than the maximum amount that can 
be guaranteed in a nonliquidating contract. 
We also assume that 
(2) L> A 
so that liquidation is less wasteful socially 
than is absconding.14 
12The concentration of bank fraud during times of 
regional or national economic decline is pronounced in 
national bank-failure data. See the Annual Report of 
the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (1920 pp. 56-79). 
13There are several ways we can approach the ques- 
tion of the maximum to be paid once the court has 
control. For simplicity, we assume that M does not 
vary with the realization of T. One argument is that 
the value of the firm might be determined by the court, 
but at a very high cost. 
"Actual liquidation costs in the United States var- 
ied historically, depending on time, location, and bank 
size but seem to have been small relative to potential 
social losses from absconding, as our model assumes. 
Bankruptcy expenses averaged between three percent 
and six percent of total collections for national banks 
between 1872 and 1904 (Brian C. Gendreau and Scott 
S. Prince, 1986). 
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In some cases, it may be desirable always 
to put the assets of the bank into liquidation 
rather than risk the banker's absconding. 
We call such an agreement a "simple li- 
quidation contract," as opposed to a "sim- 
ple nonliquidation contract," which states a 
promised repayment and leaves it to the 
banker whether to abscond or not. 
The more interesting case, however, is 
one in which the depositor, based on his 
own information, is given the option of de- 
manding liquidation or not. Specifically, 
suppose that by paying a cost I the deposi- 
tor is able to receive a signal oa in period 1 
as to the likelihood of a high (T2) or low 
(T1) realization. The action of investing in 
the signal and the result of this action are 
private. The signal oa works as follows. It 
takes on one of two values {g,b} (for "good" 
and "bad").'5 The probability of a high 
realization, contingent on the signal, is p,: 
(3) Pg > Y > Pb- 
We will use the indicator variable e E {O, 1} 
to represent the depositor's choice: e = 1 if 
there was an investment in the signal, 0 
otherwise. 
In summary, the physical structure of our 
model is as follows. There are three peri- 
ods. In period 1, the depositor may invest in 
receving a signal. In period 2, the bank may 
be liquidated. In period 3, the loan is repaid 
to the depositor, unless the banker decides 
to abscond (which he can only do if the 
bank has not been liquidated). 
B. The Contracting Structure 
Contracts are arranged in period 0. The 
monopolist banker offers the profit-maxi- 
mizing contract among those which yield 
the depositor at least S in expected returns. 
(If no such contract exists or the best such 
contract yields negative profits, then none is 
offered.) 
The universe of contracts in this structure 
is as follows. A contract is a function from a 
space of announcements E into outcomes. 
An outcome is a pair (P, A), where A E {0, 1} 
is an indicator variable equaling 1 if liquida- 
tion is mandated and 0 otherwise. P is the 
mandated repayment. (Of course P will only 
be received if the banker does not 
abscond.)16 
If the contract only specifies one out- 
come, we call it a "simple contract"; other- 
wise we call it a "compound contract." We 
have already described the two kinds of 
simple contracts: the simple liquidating con- 
tract and the simple nonliquidating con- 
tract. A straightforward application of the 
revelation principle demonstrates that, for 
the single depositor case, contracts need 
never contain more than two outcomes, be- 
cause the signal the depositor may observe 
has only two values. We can identify the 
announcements in a compound contract 
with assertions by the depositor that he has 
observed one or the other signal. Thus, a 
compound contract consists of a quartet 
(Pb, Ab, Pg, Ag). 
Each contract generates a sequential 
game in which the depositor chooses the 
level of investment in information-gathering 
(e) and the announcement he makes as a 
function of the signal he receives. The 
banker chooses whether to abscond as a 
function of the announcement made by the 
depositor and the realization on the invest- 
ment. An optimal contract is one for which 
there is a sequential equilibrium that gener- 
ates maximum profits consistent with the 
depositor's receiving expected returns equal 
to the amount S. 
15In the single-depositor case, the assumption that 
the signal takes only two values is not restrictive. In 
fact, the multidepositor model of the subsequent sec- 
tion can be reinterpreted as a single-depositor model 
with multivalued signals. 
16As it stands, the specification of the contract is 
incomplete in two technical respects. First, the specifi- 
cation of the outcome should include a specification of 
the banker's response (i.e., whether he chooses to 
abscond) as a function of the announcement a^ and of 
the realization T. However, in almost all contracts, the 
banker's response is easily discerned: he absconds if 
P6, > gAT, and does not abscond if P6r < AT. Only in 
the case of indifference would it be necessary to specify 
his response in detail. Second, the contract does not 
include the possibility of randomized outcomes. These 
can be shown never to dominate deterministic out- 
comes. 
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THEOREM 1:17 The optimal contract in the 
problem takes one of the following four forms: 
a) a simple nonliquidating contract 
b) a simple liquidating contract; in this case, 
AT1 <P < M 
c) a compound contract composed of two 
simple nonliquidating contracts (Ab= 
Ag = 0); in this case, 
Pb < AT1 and AT1 < Pg < AT2 
d) a compound contract composed of one 
simple liquidating contract and one simple 
nonliquidating contract (Ab = 1, Ag = 0); 
in this case, 
AT,< Pb< Pg < AT2. 
If the optimal contract is a compound 
contract, then the depositor invests in the 
signal; if it is a simple contract, he does not. 
In the case of compound contracts, ab- 
sconding occurs if and only if the signal was 
g but the low-value outcome T1 was real- 
ized. 
We call contract d "demandable debt." It 
works as follows: after making the deposit, 
the depositor invests in learning what the 
likely outcome will be. If he receives the 
bad signal, he opts for liquidating the bank. 
This delivers a payment with certainty. If he 
receives the good signal, he opts for not 
liquidating the bank. This promises a higher 
payment but runs the risk of the banker's 
absconding. 
Contract c works in virtually the same 
way. The only difference is that the guaran- 
teed payment in the case of a bad signal is 
sufficiently low that the banker will never 
wish to abscond and so it is not necessary to 
use liquidation to hold him in place. Since 
liquidation always involves social costs, it is 
not difficult to demonstrate that in any case 
where contract c is feasible, it dominates 
contract d. We will (with prejudice) describe 
contract c as a "nuisance contract." 
Next, we provide a characterization of 
when the various contracts will be observed. 
We do so under the assumption that the 
signal is "accurate" (i.e., pg is high and Pb 
is low, so that the signal is a good predictor 
of the state) and the signal is "cheap" (so 
that I is small). It is easily demonstrated 
that, if the signal is sufficiently inaccurate or 
sufficiently expensive, a compound contract 
is not useful. 
THEOREM 2: If the signal is sufficiently 
cheap and accurate, then there exist values 
S* and S, such that the optimal contract 
depends on the required returns S in the 
following way: for S < AT1 the simple, 
nonliquidating contract is optimal; for S E 
(AT1, S*], the nuisance contract is optimal; 
for S E (S*, S], demandable debt is optimal; 
and for S > S, no contract is feasible. 
In other words, demandable debt will be 
observed when the returns that depositors 
can receive in alternate investments are rel- 
atively high. 
III. Multiple Depositors with Independent 
Signals 
In this section, we develop a model for 
the case in which a number of depositors 
enter into contracts with the banker. As 
before, each depositor has one dollar to 
invest, and the banker has one "project" he 
can pursue. The project costs Y and yields a 
total return of YTi, which takes one of two 
values. Any deposits the banker receives in 
excess of Y can be used to yield the same 
competitive return S that depositors have 
available to them on their own. Deposits in 
excess of Y will be identified with "re- 
serves." 
We make the following natural assump- 
tions about the difference between the two 
forms of bank assets, "project" and "re- 
serves." If the bank is liquidated, the value 
of the project decreases by 1 - L; the value 
of the reserves is unchanged.18 If the banker 
17Proofs of theorems are outlined in the Appendix. 
18This assumption is natural, given that we regard 
the project as requiring the banker's expertise and 
regard the reserves as invested in publicly available 
technologies. 
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TABLE 1-PAYOFFS ON EACH OF THE THREE NODES 
OF THE GAME TREE 
Contract Banker receives Depositors receive 
Liquidation (1- L)TY+(Z- Y)S- P P 
No liquidation 
Banker absconds (1 - A)TY (Z - Y)S 
Banker does not abscond TlY + (Z - Y)S - P P 
absconds, then he takes the projects with 
him and receives (1 - A)YTi. The depositors 
retain the entirety of the reserves.19 We 
strengthen assumption (2) as follows: 
(4) L < A(T1 / T2). 
There are Z individuals available to enter 
into a contract with the bank. Of these 
individuals, K can receive signals by invest- 
ing at a cost I; for the remainder, the cost 
of receiving a signal is prohibitive.20 Signals 
are independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) conditional on T,. For any individual, 
a "bad" signal is associated with reduced 
likelihood of the high-productivity state T2, 
SO Pb < pg as before. 
Supposing that all K individuals have in- 
vested in the signal, let N be the number 
who receive the "bad" realization. Given 
the i.i.d. structure, N is a sufficient statistic 
for Ti, and the probability that the realiza- 
tion is T2 decreases with N. 
A. The Contract from the Banker's 
Viewpoint 
We start by examining only the incentive 
problem for the banker, taking the behavior 
of all depositors as given. We will return to 
the individual depositors' incentives in the 
succeeding subsection. For now, we assume 
that all K individuals who can invest in 
obtaining the information do so and report 
it truthfully.21 A contract specifies an aggre- 
gate payment P and a liquidation decision 
A as functions of the number of depositors 
who announce observations of the bad sig- 
nal. (In the succeeding subsection, we will 
investigate a scheme for dividing aggregate 
payments among the depositors.) Note 
therefore that the contract is the direct gen- 
eralization of the contract in the previous 
section to a case of multiple signals. 
After the announcement of the signals, 
the game tree is as before: if a liquidation is 
not mandated, the banker makes a decision 
whether to abscond. Table 1 describes the 
payoffs on each of the three nodes of the 
game tree. 
The optimal contract maximizes the 
banker's expected profits subject to three 
restrictions. 
1) The expected payments to the depositors 
equal their aggregate reservation level: 
SZ + KJ. 
That is, all depositors must be compen- 
sated for the opportunity cost of their 
funds; in addition, any monitors must be 
compensated for the cost of monitoring. 
2) In the case of liquidation, actual pay- 
ment cannot exceed what is assumed fea- 
sible; as before, we suppose that a liqui- 
dated investment Y pays off at most MY 
to the depositors. Thus, the total pay- 
19An alternative assumption is that, if the banker 
absconds, he takes the entirety of the reserves as well. 
The assumption in the text is natural if we regard 
absconding as occurring by siphoning a project into a 
less desirable project whose returns accrue directly to 
the banker. The assumption in this footnote is natural 
if we regard absconding as occurring when the banker 
piles the loot into the stagecoach and heads out of 
town. 
20This is the simplest structure of supply of signals; 
it can be generalized. Alternatively, the cost of invest- 
ing in a signal could be determined in a general equi- 
librium model. 
21It will be clear that, as long as the cost of investing 
in the signal is sufficiently low, it is optimal to have all 
individuals with cost I make the investment. 
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ment to depositors out of the project and 
the reserves is 
P<MY+(Z-Y)S if A=1. 
3) Finally we must consider the banker's 
incentive to abscond. If liquidation does 
not occur, then the banker will prefer to 
abscond whenever 
ATY < P-( Z-Y)S. 
If the inequality is reversed the banker 
prefers not to abscond. 
As before, we define S to be the least 
upper bound of feasible expected returns to 
depositors from the project; if the required 
rate of return exceeds S, no contract is 
feasible. S can be calculated explicitly. 
Our first result is that, for required re- 
turns which are sufficiently high (but less 
than S), the optimal contract calls for liqui- 
dation when the number of bad signals is 
high, and not when the number of bad 
signals is low. When the number of bad 
signals is low, there is a positive (but small) 
probability that the banker will abscond. 
THEOREM 3: For an interval of values of 
S, (S, S], the optimal contract has the follow- 
ing form: there exists N such that: 
If N>N, A(N) =1 and 
P(N) = MY+ ( Z-Y)S; 
If N<N, A(N) =0 and 
P(N) = AT2Y +(Z-Y)S. 
In other words, the contract has informed 
agents announce whether their signal was 
bad. If more than a critical number N an- 
nounce bad signals, the bank is liquidated. 
If fewer than N announce bad signals, the 
bank is not liquidated, and the banker 
chooses to abscond if the productivity draw 
was low.22 
Note that Z is arbitrary in this contract. 
As Z increases, the optimal P increases 
one-for-one: additional deposits beyond 
those invested in the project are held in 
reserves and returned to the depositors with 
certainty.23 
B. Depositor Incentives 
It remains to be shown that the total 
aggregate payment to depositors specified 
in the previous section can be divided among 
depositors in such a way as to maintain the 
incentives for low-cost-information deposi- 
tors to invest in the signal and to report it 
truthfully. In this section, we derive a de- 
mandable-debt contract that achieves this 
goal. 
We make the following assumptions about 
the population of monitors and the signals: 
ASSUMPTIONS: There are large numbers 
of potential depositors (Z) and potential 
monitors (K). The cost of monitoring (I) is 
small. The probability of any one monitor 
receiving a bad signal is small. The probabil- 
ity of a bad realization of T is small (al- 
though the losses can be large). 
In modeling a bank, each of these as- 
sumptions seems natural to us. The assump- 
tions allow us to model the distribution of 
the number of bad signals as a Poisson 
distribution. More precise criteria for "small 
enough" or "large enough" are indicated in 
the complete appendix (available upon re- 
quest). Note that as long as I is sufficiently 
22 If exactly N announce bad signals, the optimal 
contract has a randomization between liquidation and 
nonliquidation. We omit the details. 
It can be shown that, for values of S below this 
range, it will be useful to have two thresholds rather 
than one. For a range of values of bad signals received, 
it will be optimal to reduce the promised payment, 
rather than liquidate the bank. This is analogous to the 
nuisance contract discussed previously, and as before, 
it can be precluded by sufficiently high reservation 
levels of return. 
23Here, reserves are used solely for redistributing 
payouts between monitors and nonmonitors in an in- 
centive-compatible way. In a richer model, banks would 
choose between holding reserves and investing more in 
higher-earning projects. 
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TABLE 2-PAYOFF TO DEPOSITOR WHO ANNOUNCES g 
Payoff to depositor announcing g 
Number of depositors Number of depositors 
Project realization announcing b < N announcing b > N 
AT2 + (Z-Y )S-RN MY + (Z-Y)S-RN 
Z-N Z-N 
T2 ((Z-Y)S-RN MY+ ( Z-Y)S-RN 
Z-N Z-N 
small, it is always optimal to have all the 
potential monitors engage in investment. 
The contract for all depositors is identi- 
cal. Ex post depositors will pick one of two 
announcements within the contract. Since 
there are three information possibilities 
(observing g, observing b, or not making an 
investment), there will have to be some 
pooling in the outcomes. We will build a 
contract in which it is incentive-compatible 
for the depositors who have made no invest- 
ment to pool with those who have observed 
the good draw. 
Each depositor's payoff depends on his 
announcement and the signal (if any) he 
observes. We let the symbol EU(6, or) de- 
note the expected return for a depositor 
who observes signal oa and announces sig- 
nal 6. 
Individual depositors are subject to two 
sorts of constraints: participation con- 
straints (i.e., the contract must give ex- 
pected returns that are sufficient for de- 
positors to participate) and incentive 
constraints. From the point of view of the 
individual depositors, the contract must sat- 
isfy the following requirements. 
1) Always announcing g gives an expected 
return of S, which exceeds the expected 
return from always announcing b. This 
means that depositors with high costs of 
gathering information will be willing to 
participate in the contract in the manner 
specified. 
2) Announcing the observation truthfully 
gives a return of S + I, which exceeds 
the return from lying. If conditions in 
requirement 1 are satisfied as well, then 
individuals with a cost of I for investing 
are willing to make the investment in 
monitoring and report truthfully. 
These constraints for individual depositors 
can be written as follows: 
AEU(g,=g) +(1- A)EU(b,b) 
=S 2 AEU(6b,g)+ (l 1A)EU(^b, b) 
AEU(g, g) + (1- A)EU(b, b) 
= S + I? AEU(b,g) + (1- A)EU(g,b) 
where A is the prior probability of signal g. 
The scheme we consider has payments of 
a particularly simple form: any depositor 
announcing b receives the payment R with 
certainty. We can call an announcement b a 
"withdrawal of funds." If more than N de- 
positors announce b, the bank is liquidated; 
otherwise, it is not, and the banker has the 
option of absconding. In any event, those 
depositors who do not announce b evenly 
split the aggregate payment to depositors 
described in the previous section, less the 
funds withdrawn. We call this scheme a 
"standard demandable-debt contract." 
Under a standard demandable-debt con- 
tract, of course, 
EU(b,b) = EU(b,g) = R. 
However, for depositors who do not with- 
draw their funds, the payment depends on 
the number of depositors N who do with- 
draw, and on whether the banker absconds. 
Table 2 describes the payments for a depos- 
itor who announces g. 
For example, if more than N depositors 
withdraw funds, then the bank is liquidated, 
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and according to the contract, the total pay- 
ment to depositors P is MY + (Z - Y)S; 
that quantity, less the withdrawn deposits 
RN is split among the remaining depositors 
Z - N, yielding the quantity in the right- 
most column of the table. The remaining 
numbers are calculated in a similar fashion. 
Given the probabilities of the realizations 
of Ti and the probability of each signal 
contingent on Ti, it is a straightforward mat- 
ter to calculate EU(g, b) and EU(, g). For 
this scheme, the incentive and participation 
constraints reduce to the following:24 
EU(g,b) = R - I/(1-A) 
S > R. 
When an aggregate contract of the sort 
described in the previous section is optimal, 
it can always be implemented with a de- 
mandable-debt scheme, as stated in the fol- 
lowing theorem. 
THEOREM 4: Under the distributional as- 
sumptions and the conditions of the previous 
theorem, the optimal outcome can be 
achieved with a simple demandable-debt con- 
tract. 
The role of reserves in our model war- 
rants discussion. By holding reserves, the 
bank is able to guarantee early payment to a 
small number of monitors (those who re- 
ceive bad signals) without forcing the bank 
to be placed into receivership. Reserves al- 
low the bank to commit to the sequential- 
service constraint (early withdrawals by 
those who run the bank), which supports 
the implementation of the contract between 
bankers and depositors. More familiar justi- 
fications for bank reserve holding include 
the usefulness of reserves in meeting 
stochastic demands for conversion into gold 
(say, due to foreign-transactions needs of 
depositors) or the contribution of reserves 
to an optimally diversified portfolio of bank 
assets. Our model adds to these transac- 
tions and portfolio motivations for holding 
reserves an "incentive-compatibility" de- 
mand for reserves. 
C. Transactability and Demandable Debt 
Thus far, we have argued that demand- 
able-debt intermediation may arise in order 
to permit profitable investment opportuni- 
ties to be realized. In our models, there is 
no demand for transactability; therefore, as- 
sets are valued entirely based on expected 
return. Historically, however, an important 
feature of demandable-debt instruments has 
been their use as a medium of exchange. In 
this subsection, we briefly consider the im- 
plications of our model for the liquidity of 
demandable debt. 
It is important to note from the outset 
that transactable instruments need not be 
demandable. Postdated bills of exchange 
and postdated bank notes were physically 
transactable instruments that existed in the 
19th century in the United States (Davis R. 
Dewey, 1910). Their primary difference from 
demandable debt was that they could be 
redeemed, not on demand, but only on the 
date of maturity. Since such instruments 
could be maturity-matched, they would seem 
to have none of the disadvantages of de- 
mandable debt. Nonetheless, demandable 
debt outcompeted these as a medium of 
exchange. 
In order to explain the relative liquidity 
of demandable debt, one must explain why 
the ability to redeem a bank note or deposit 
on demand makes people more willing to 
accept it as a means of payment. We argue 
that, under demandable debt, monitors and 
nonmonitors alike are better informed of 
the market value of the debt instrument at 
all times.25 
24The constraints initially have two equalities that 
must be satisfied. However, given the fact that the total 
expected payments equal SZ + Kl, as they do by con- 
struction of the demandable-debt contract, one of the 
equations is redundant: if the informed depositors are 
each receiving S + I, then the uninformed depositors 
are automatically receiving the remainder, or S per 
depositor. 
251n a different context, Gorton and Pennacchi 
(1990) also employ this definition of liquidity. They 
show that debt instruments may be more liquid than 
equity because debt instruments reduce the potential 
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The fact that "the bank is open" (that 
monitors have not called for a liquidation) 
is revealing to nonmonitors. In the simplest, 
one-monitor case, the fact that the bank is 
open is fully revealing, because the signal 
that the monitor receives takes one of two 
values. In the multimonitor case, the fact 
that the bank is open is not fully revealing; 
it only indicates that fewer than the thresh- 
old number of bad signals have been an- 
nounced. Even this information, however, 
places a lower bound on the value of the 
bank's liability.26 If the liquidity of an asset 
depends on the extent to which information 
about its value is shared, then one would 
expect demandable debt to have been more 
liquid than other contracts with which it 
competed (see George Akerlof, 1970; 
Benjamin Klein, 1974). Thus, it may be pos- 
sible to view the liquidity of bank claims as 
a by-product of the solution to the agency 
problem. 
While we argue that the transactability 
of demandable debt enhanced its attrac- 
tiveness, it is interesting to note that 
demandable-debt banking predates the 
transactability of demandable debt.27 Thus, 
the desirability of demandable-debt con- 
tracting does not seem to have depended 
crucially on the transactability of the instru- 
ments. 
The "liquidity premium" that demand- 
able debt enjoys can be included in our 
framework by reducing the level of the re- 
quired return S on demandable debt by the 
amount of the liquidity premium. In other 
words, demandable debt would face a lower 
threshold reservation level to satisfy than 
the nonliquidating compound contract. This 
implies an expansion of the parameter val- 
ues for which demandable debt is preferred 
over the "nuisance" contract. 
IV. Summary 
We have argued that historical demand- 
able-debt banking can be understood as the 
optimal means of incentive-compatible in- 
termediation in an environment of asym- 
metric information with potential for fraud- 
ulent behavior on the part of the banker. 
Monitoring by some depositors and runs by 
monitors who receive bad signals ensure 
sufficiently high payoffs to depositors in 
states of the world that would otherwise 
lead to malfeasance by the banker. 
Agency problems are inherent in banking. 
Depositors entrust their endowments to 
bankers, who decide how to invest them and 
have essentially unfettered immediate con- 
trol over the depositors' funds. We capture 
this agency problem in a simple way by 
allowing the potential for "absconding" by 
the banker. The banker has the ability to 
remove funds from the bank. Absconding is 
socially wasteful; if the banker steals funds 
from the bank, he uses a "leaky bucket," so 
that the amount he actually receives is less 
than the amount stolen. 
If the required return for depositors is 
sufficiently high, then the banker may find it 
attractive to abscond, rather than make the 
promised payment to depositors. Anticipat- 
ing this, depositors will be unwilling to en- 
trust their funds to the banker, and efficient 
intermediation will not take place. In other 
words, the possibility for a banker to ab- 
scond may make it difficult for him to at- 
tract depositors to his bank. 
We introduce a liquidation technology 
that allows depositors, at a cost, to prevent 
the banker from absconding and makes it 
gains insiders can receive from trading. Their model 
does not, however, explain the special liquidity of de- 
mandable debt. 
26Historically, specie prices of bank notes published 
in bank-note "reporters" confirm the view that non- 
monitors faced little price uncertainty for notes of 
banks that were open. Discounts on antebellum bank 
notes convertible on demand into specie traded in the 
home city at par; in distant locations, the discounts for 
notes mainly reflected the risk due to the time it would 
take to reach the city of issue. Typically, one could 
know the value of a bank's notes in New York by 
knowing the state in which the bank was located. These 
discounts typically remained small (between 8 percent 
and 2 percent) and were subject to little variation. 
Discounts of notes for failed banks were not quoted in 
bank-note reporters or were subject to extreme varia- 
tions across banks in the same locale and over time 
(see Calomiris and Schweikart, 1988). 
27For example, Roman banks issued demandable 
claims which were not transactable (A. W. Ferrin, 
1908). 
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possible for the banker to attract deposi- 
tors. We show that, under some circum- 
stances, the optimal arrangement has the 
depositor choose whether to liquidate the 
bank, contingent on a costly signal he re- 
ceives. In good states, it will pay for the 
banker not to abscond and to pay the de- 
positor as promised; in bad states, absent a 
liquidation announcement, the banker will 
abscond rather than pay as promised. Thus, 
when monitors receive bad signals, they call 
for liquidation. 
If the signal is perfect and costless to the 
depositor, liquidation will occur only when 
there are bad loan-investment realizations. 
If the signal is imperfect and costly, but not 
prohibitively so, it still makes sense to use 
the contingent liquidation contract, even 
though on occasion monitoring depositors 
may make errors in judging when to "run 
the bank" and force the bank to liquidate 
unnecessarily. Banks can fail either because 
the banker absconds or because the deposi- 
tor initiates a run on the bank. The purpose 
of a run is to prevent absconding from tak- 
ing place. 
In the case of multiple depositors, the 
bank uses reserves to offer guaranteed pay- 
ments to early withdrawers and to insulate 
itself from a few bad idiosyncratic signals. 
At the same time, under circumstances that 
probably would lead to costly absconding, 
depositors as a group are likely to order 
liquidation preemptively. The number of 
monitors and the threshold at which a bank 
liquidation is called for will be chosen opti- 
mally to minimize total expected costs of 
liquidation, absconding, and monitoring. 
Limitations and Suggested Extensions 
Our analysis has several important limita- 
tions. First, our goal is to explain the histor- 
ical importance of demandable debt in 
banking. In today's more regulated environ- 
ment, where for example, regulations on 
clearing through the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem have favored demandable-debt instru- 
ments and where deposit insurance makes 
depositor monitoring less important, de- 
mandable debt may persist simply as an 
artifact of regulation. 
Second, our framework does not consider 
the possibility of trade in bank shares. Un- 
like the historical context in which demand- 
able debt arose, in today's more sophisti- 
cated financial markets, shares of financial 
intermediaries are actively traded. In this 
richer context, equity trading could conceiv- 
ably provide a superior disciplinary alterna- 
tive to demandable debt and contingent liq- 
uidation. For example, leveraged buy-outs 
offer a possible alternative means to prevent 
managerial misconduct and provide rewards 
that make monitoring incentive-compatible. 
Third, our account is one of individual 
banks and individual bank liquidations, not 
of systems of banks or economy-wide bank 
panics. We are only attempting to model 
the operation of demandable debt in nor- 
mal times, when the rules require banks to 
pay on demand. In historical practice, the 
provisions of demandable debt, including 
liquidation, were suspended during crises 
(see James G. Cannon, 1910; Calomiris and 
Schweikart, 1988). That is to say, demand- 
able debt was a contingent rule; it required 
banks to meet the threat of runs in response 
to idiosyncratic problems, but it allowed 
banks to escape convertibility on demand in 
the face of systemic disturbances. Only indi- 
vidual bank difficulties led to placing a bank 
in receivership. Suspension and interbank 
relations during panics are important as 
well, but doing this topic justice requires a 
larger analysis than the one we have under- 
taken in this paper (see Calomiris and Kahn, 
1989; Gorton, 1989; Calomiris and Gorton, 
1990). 
Fourth, our model relies on a crude and 
extremely stylized incentive problem char- 
acterized by the "leaky bucket" with which 
the banker can abscond. This leaky-bucket 
assumption is useful, because it allows us to 
model the problem in an extremely simple 
way, but it raises natural questions as to 
whether the degree of leakiness necessary 
to generate the results is at all realistic. 
After all, if the banker's own stake is less 
than 1 percent of the value of the assets, 
then it would be necessary that more than 
99 percent of the value of the assets leak 
from the bucket in good times in order to 
keep the banker from absconding. 
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A more reasonable interpretation of our 
story is as a simplification of a multiperiod 
account, in which the banker is in fact 
choosing whether to engage in malfeasance 
today, when the decision not to engage in 
malfeasance always leaves the option open 
for tomorrow. Suppose that the returns to a 
bank's investments are intertemporally cor- 
related. Then, in a good realization, the 
banker may be unwilling to engage in 
malfeasance because it will destroy the 
prospects for future returns (including the 
possibility of future malfeasance), even 
without assuming the bucket implausibly 
leaky.28 Thus, is is important to investigate 
multiperiod versions of our model to deter- 
mine whether a consistent account can be 
generated with plausible parameter values. 
Finally, our model does not include any 
demand for liquidity. We have intentionally 
limited the model in order to emphasize the 
difference between our account and those 
accounts that depend on liquidity demand. 
Nonetheless, this limitation means that the 
model is not adequate to investigate the 
relation between demandable debt and 
transactions demand. Although we have 
briefly and informally considered the links, 
formal models combining the consumption- 
flexibility and monitoring accounts of bank- 
ing are an important goal for future re- 
search. 
APPENDIX: SKETCHES OF PROOFS 
To conserve space, we briefly describe the 
proofs for each of the four theorems. The 
complete Appendix is available from the 
authors on request. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: 
The claim that an optimal contract must 
conform to one of the four cases listed in 
the theorem is equivalent to the following 
claims. 
a) If the promised payment is less than the 
minimum absconding tax (AT1), then liq- 
uidation is never called for, since ab- 
sconding is socially wasteful and simple 
debt repayment is always credibly pre- 
ferred ex post by the banker. 
b) If the optimal contract is a compound 
contract, then it cannot specify liquida- 
tion in all states, since in that case there 
would be no incentive to invest in sig- 
nals. If liquidation is going to be called 
for, it must be that it is only called for 
under the bad signal. 
c) If the optimal contract involves monitor- 
ing and contingent debt claims (the de- 
positor announces one of two values to 
be repaid), then the amount announced 
contingent on the bad signal will be lower 
than the one announced contingent on 
the good signal, and the lower amount 
will be less than the minimum abscond- 
ing tax. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: 
When S < AT1, it is immediate that a 
simple debt contract is optimal. When the 
banker chooses between the demandable- 
debt and nuisance contracts, the banker will 
always choose the nuisance contract when it 
is feasible, because it is less socially wasteful 
than demandable debt. In the nuisance con- 
tract, social waste occurs through abscond- 
ing when a good signal is received but a bad 
outcome is realized. In the demandable-debt 
contract, an additional source of waste is 
the liquidation cost when the bad signal is 
received. It can be shown that, as the reser- 
vation level of the depositor rises, liquida- 
tion will eventually be required to increase 
the depositor's returns beyond what is feasi- 
ble in the nuisance contract. The use of 
either form of compound contract requires 
that the costs of receiving the signal be 
sufficiently low and the signal's accuracy be 
sufficiently high to warrant investment in 
the signal. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: 
The optimal contract is designed to give 
the depositors their required expected re- 
turn while minimizing expected social waste 
from absconding and liquidation. The opti- 
mal contract in general involves dividing the 
possible values of N into three regions. For 
28We are grateful to an anonymous referee for 
suggesting this interpretation. 
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high values of N, the contract mandates 
liquidation. For intermediate values of N (a 
nuisance region), liquidation is not man- 
dated, but aggregate payment is set suffi- 
ciently low that absconding never occurs. 
For low values of N, liquidation is not man- 
dated, and payment is set sufficiently high 
that absconding takes place in bad states. It 
can be shown that, as the reservation level 
of depositors rises, the middle nuisance re- 
gion disappears, in order to expand the 
range of higher depositor returns achieved 
through liquidation or high but uncertain 
payments. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: 
Given the payoff structure, one can write 
monitors' and nonmonitors' individual ex- 
pected returns as functions of the signals 
received and announced by each, given the 
probability of other depositors' signals and 
actions. Tedious but straightforward cal- 
culation demonstrates that, for Z and N 
sufficiently large, the returns so calculated 
satisfy individual incentive and aggregate 
feasibility constraints. Finally we show that 
N sufficiently large can always be found, 
provided the probability of the good out- 
come exceeds a certain minimum level. 
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